Mass Nouns, Count Nouns and Non-Count Laycock – – In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. A crucial part of Taurek’s argument is his contention that i. John M. Taurek, ” Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 4. (Summer I ). Oxford University Press USA publishes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, children’s books, business books, dictionaries, reference.

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First, many in this debate have focused on the complete prevention of a harm in a Taurek Scenario. Instead, the conclusion is that saving the greater number is better. These terms are left to be interpreted in a roughly intuitive manner. No keywords specified fix it.

I suggest the following principle: Aggregation and two moral methods. To counh more about what is and is not considered philosophy for the purposes of this subreddit, see our FAQ.

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John M. Taurek, Should the numbers count? – PhilPapers

See also Hirose, I. In fact, someone who holds the view that persons are incommensurable may not even need to toss a coin. If you have unrelated thoughts or don’t wish to read the content, please post your own thread or simply refrain from commenting. In that case, accommodating this alleged fact could similarly be done by giving all four Jedi a chance of being aided.

Others might argue that there are other reasons to be concerned about aggregation, even if aggregation is no more disrespectful of the separateness of persons than substitution and the like.



Otsuka argues that numbers skepticism, in conjunction with an independently plausible moral principle, leads to inconsistent choices regarding what ought to be done in certain circumstances. A number of writers have however argued that the Kamm-Scanlon Argument covertly involves combining claims. Meta-posts, products, services, surveys, AMAs and links to other areas of numvers require moderator pre-approval.

Why the Numbers Count. If S does nothing, then no one will be spared from harm. Woodward – – Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 4: See also Timmermann, “The Individualist Lottery,” op. What we owe to each other.

Don’t Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting | Yishai Cohen –

I take Timmerman Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm: While this paper touches on the moral status of the conference of a benefit in this limited sense of the term, I will not be concerned with moral principles concerning the conference of a benefit where that benefit does not consist in either the prevention of a potential harm or the prevention of a persisting harm that one has already been enduring.

The rejection of PAI opens up an opportunity for pro-number nonconsequentialists to offer a different view of the separateness of persons, one in which pairwise interpersonal comparison, substitution, balancing and division would be permitted. Note that I am not arguing that nonconsequentialists are wrong to criticize aggregation from the perspective of the separateness of persons.

I think there is. Accordingly, in i A suffers to degree n and Secura suffers to degree 10n. The following not exhaustive list of items require moderator pre-approval: Use of this site constitutes acceptance of our User Agreement and Privacy Policy.

PAA says that what is distinctive about persons is not that they are incommensurable or that they each embody an equal claim that cannot be aggregated but can be substituted, compared and so on; but that they are moral agents capable of deliberating and being persuaded by moral reasons. All posts must develop and defend a substantive philosophical thesis. I shall now argue that this dilemma may be more apparent than real.


From 3, one can substitute A with B. The claim that one ought to save the many instead of the few was made to rest on the claim that, other things being equal, it is a worse thing that these five persons should die than that this one should. I will assume henceforth that any true moral principle with respect to the complete prevention of a harm in a Taurek Scenario is likewise true, mutatis mutandis, with respect to the mitigation of a harm in a Taurek Scenario.

The Case against Numbers Skepticism Otsuka argues that PN, in conjunction with an additional moral principle, entails inconsistent choices regarding what ought to be done in certain circumstances, and that this a reason to reject PN as well as Numbers Skepticism. For example, to avoid the implication that a large number of small harms can add up to outweigh a smaller number of large harms, nonconsequentialists could employ and have employed something like the Principle of Triviality to constrain aggregation without rejecting it.

In particular, coung, Otsuka has argued that the anti-number position leads to a choice-defeating intransitivity as a result of endorsing the principle of nonaggregation and affirming pairwise comparisons “Skepticism about Saving the Greater Number.